

13 July 2015

Linda Falwasser
Strategic Communications Manager
Southern Response Earthquake Services limited
Christchurch

Dear Linda

RE: Review of security measures and increased risk

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Thank you for your instructions in this matter. Thompson & Clark were notified on 7 July 2015 that a particular claimant, [REDACTED] has continued to send a number of emails addressed to the Southern Response board raising concerns as to the threat [REDACTED] poses to the board and key members of staff and the level of risk Southern Response personnel are exposed to:
2. In a particular email from Mr [REDACTED] on the 6 July 2015 to [REDACTED] (interim account manager) and members of the board the tone of the email is less to do with the actual claim but more about individuals and side issues. In particular matters of concern in this email are:
3. Mr [REDACTED] belief that Southern Response Deputy Chair, Anne Urlwin, shared private information to Southern Response CEO (Peter Rose) who in turn shared personal emails to [REDACTED] biggest client in an attempt to intimidate and bully [REDACTED] and his family. (It is believed that this client of [REDACTED] [REDACTED]).
4. Mr [REDACTED] believes that this personal attack was undertaken at the direction of the Southern Response board with full knowledge of the Minister, Shareholding Minister and Prime Minister.
5. Mr [REDACTED] states that this matter is about to be made public and requests a verbal discussion with the main recipient [REDACTED] which Mr [REDACTED] intends to have witnessed and recorded.
6. Mr [REDACTED] belief that a personal attack was conducted by Mr Rose which had a terminal effect for Mr [REDACTED] business which was the sole source of income for him and his family.
7. The above email, although direct, is not offensive or threatening but does indicate that Mr [REDACTED] is consumed by side issues around his claim that are not actually relevant to his claim. He is direct and demands deadlines which do not appear to be reasonable. Of concern is the comment that he blames others for his business being dealt a terminal blow and that this being the sole income for his family indicates that he could be a desperate man if exposed to financial pressure.
8. Thompson and Clark have responded by providing a consultant on 8 July 2015 to attend at your office in Christchurch and conduct an initial scope of the current security measures in place and an assessment of the current threat. A number of people were spoken to during our visit. Also since our attendance we have been kept abreast of further developments as this matter continues to unfold.
9. Thompson & Clark to date have conducted the following documented processes for Southern Response.
10. A site security review for its office situated at 6 Show Place, Christchurch, in February 2014, we note that since this review of security measures Southern Response now also operate from the second floor of 10 Show Place.
11. A threat assessment conducted on the 11 March 2014.
12. Residential Security Reviews for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].
13. Security Response plans for the above three as well as [REDACTED].
14. As a result of our findings on the 8 July Thompson & Clark have outlined a number of recommendations which have are specified later in this document.

SITE SECURITY REVIEW

15. As outlined above this review was conducted in February 2014 and since then Southern Response has consolidated its Auckland operation to Christchurch as well as increased staff numbers by integrating with Arrow, staff now totalling approximately 360 personnel. As a result of this growth it has required the business to now obtain further office space on level 2, number 10 Show Place, Addington, Christchurch.
16. Number 10 Show Place has no obvious signage and has an access controlled door at the main office entrance on the level 2 foyer, there is no reception or guard presence in this building and it is not currently equipped with an alarm system. This office is a single level open plan format and is the location of the Southern Response senior management team.
17. Although this site isn't used for visitor meetings, some contractors do attend this site so better controls on the building would enhance the overall security.
18. **Recommendation 1- A full security review of the building at 10 Show place is recommended.**
19. As a result of the initial security review conducted in February 2014 at 6 Show Place, a number of recommendations were made and some of these have been implemented, namely:
20. Install five extra CCTV cameras.
Extra internal CCTV cameras have been installed increasing the coverage.
21. Ensure retention on hard drive of 30+ days.
Recording and retention capacity has been improved.
22. A lighting survey should be conducted.
Since the construction of the building next door to number 6 (10 Show Place) there has been improved general ambient light in the area.
23. Integrate to centralised access control system and manage internally.
Although the internal ACS is still managed by ECL (SR contractor) and the external ASC by Goodmans (building manager) this system works well and the relationship between the parties is good. The structure of the cards being issued has now been reviewed and personnel are only given 24/7 access to the floor that they work on and not all floors as in the past.
24. Undertake external integrity test of IT.
A penetration and vulnerability test has been undertaken by KPMG. Some integrity testing has been performed by Commarc, IT provider for Arrow after a leaked email enquiry.
25. Security Guard monitoring and response.
Security personnel (First Security) present at 6 Show place have a panic button which is responded to by their own office which is in close proximity to this site.
26. Create Security awareness and responsibility amongst staff.
A personal security training session is being conducted by Southern Response staff members [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].
27. Relocate reception to main entry to monitor access.

The reception desk hasn't been relocated however consideration was given to this but as it is positioned behind a locked door and the downstairs security desk is the first point of contact for visitors it was deemed prudent to leave the reception desk in its current position.

28. Integrate panic alarms into Access control system.
This has not been integrated into the ACS but panic buttons are situated in each customer meeting room as well as reception. These have been inadvertently tested and there are set roles established for designated members of staff.
29. Develop a policy and procedure including escalation plan for reception.
As above.
30. Even though some of the recommendations suggested in the Feb 14 review have been implemented there is still some concern around the effectiveness of some controls already in place. For instance the main security guard [REDACTED] only spends 50% of guard time on site, the second guard [REDACTED] fills the remaining 50% of guard shifts. Also at the time of our visit on the 8th July a third guard, a reliever called [REDACTED], was also present with [REDACTED] receiving an induction and training. Having more than one guard trained for the role is a robust system however it is likely that the competence and level of understanding of the role for each guard varies considerably. After [REDACTED] had left the relief guard in charge on his own we questioned [REDACTED] whether he had a book of known people that had been trespassed from the site. He could not immediately locate this book but then managed to do so, he was able to name the person trespassed but it was questionable whether other likely threats to SR personnel were known or adequately outlined to the guard in this book.
31. Thompson & Clark also received conflicting reports from people who were spoken to as to what action and role the guards should take upon a security breach within the building.
32. It is prudent that Southern Response have the February 2104 review updated to current date and a gap analysis conducted.
33. **Recommendation 2- We recommend a revisit to the existing security review and a gap analysis conducted with a focus on implementing a more active response to security policy including scenario training with key personnel such as security guards and key staff.**

THREAT ASSESSMENT

34. The Threat Assessment conducted by Thompson & Clark in March 2014 is largely outdated and although it covers specific Issue Motivated Groups (IMGs), it does not specifically examine specific Issue Motivated Individuals (IMIs) such as Mr [REDACTED]. Some of the points raised in the 2014 threat assessment are still relevant to this issue. This report is not a threat assessment however we note the following points:
35. Lessons have been learnt from organisations such as Ministry of Social Development post the Ashburton Work and Income homicides. Namely security and safety should be a top priority for organisations.
36. Mr [REDACTED] did not attend the 2104 Southern Response annual public meeting however attended the one in 2013. Prior to and during that meeting Mr [REDACTED] attempted to ask 50 questions at the APM, the specific nature of these questions indicated that he had obtained this project report which was an SR document and had been supplied to [REDACTED]. This document had been supplied to [REDACTED] by Southern Response in an attempt by one government department to assist another government

department in obtaining valuable learnings from this report. At the time Mr [REDACTED] was working as a contractor to [REDACTED] in his role as director of A [REDACTED] (providing [REDACTED]). It is believed that Mr [REDACTED] had obtained this report during his contract employment at [REDACTED] although he was not authorised to obtain or use this document. It is probable that [REDACTED] conducted its own internal investigation which resulted in the [REDACTED] contract not being renewed however the exact reasons for [REDACTED] terminating Mr [REDACTED] contract is not known only speculated in this report.

37. Consequently Mr [REDACTED] blames Southern Response individuals for his company losing the [REDACTED] contract.

38. It has been identified that Mr [REDACTED] has sent the Southern Response board 195 emails in the last 6 months (6 Jan to 24 June), a little over an email a day.

39. These emails have been reviewed by Thompson & Clark and the grievances listed by Mr [REDACTED] can be summarised as follows:

40. Ongoing & unreasonable delays

41. Misrepresentation & doctoring of reports

42. 'Dodgy' repair techniques

43. Allegations that he and his family have been bullied / intimidated

44. Defamation allegations against Peter Rose

45. Withholding information

46. Destruction of file information

47. Cover ups

48. Blocking his emails

49. Refusal to communicate / ignoring questions

50. Allegations of law breaches

51. Unprofessional behaviour

52. During his communications, [REDACTED] is polite and seemingly informed. He appears intelligent and measured in his responses, if not a little mocking at times. There is no evidence of foul language and his obvious frustrations are generally well controlled. He admits that his family have "come under a great deal of stress" as a result of his disagreements with SR.

53. The majority of his communication has been with Victor Wells and to a lesser degree [REDACTED]

54. [REDACTED]

55. Thompson & Clark are not lawyers and understand that Southern Response have requested a legal opinion on this matter from its existing lawyer.

56. [REDACTED]

57. [REDACTED]

58. There have been two phone calls which have been between Mr [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Both of these have been recorded by Mr [REDACTED] and provided by him to Southern Response. These have been reviewed by Thompson & Clark.

59. In our opinion these two phone calls appear to be an attempt by Mr [REDACTED] to corral Southern Response into a corner for his own reasons. Mr [REDACTED] appears to be very focused on not using abusive terms or becoming threatening but it is obvious that he is very controlling and he makes demands such as his expectation of answers and response times which appear unreasonable.

60. **Recommendation 4- We recommend that Southern Response limit its contact with Mr [REDACTED] to written correspondence only.**

61. It is difficult to determine the mind set of this individual and in particular whether he is a considerable threat to Southern Response personnel.

62. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED], this incident does somewhat sum up Mr [REDACTED] as being intense and compulsive with a victim mentality.

63. [REDACTED]

64. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

RESIDENTIAL SECURITY REVIEWS

65. As outlined above a number of residential security reviews have been conducted for key personnel. Some personnel who were recommended have these RSR's did not elect to do so and since these were conducted there have been some other key individuals within the organisation who have a higher profile now particularly in respect of concerns raised around Mr [REDACTED] These individuals include:

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

66. New Zealand and, in particular, Christchurch is a small place and peoples home addresses are easy to locate through simple means such as the white pages or companies office. The purpose of a residential security review is to ensure that the member's home has simple and adequate security measures to ensure that their family home is secure as practicably as can be.

67. **Recommendation 6- The above identified members of staff who may be at risk should be offered a residential security review.**

SECURITY RESPONSE PLANS

68. As above a number of Southern Response executive have had security response plans put in place, these plans are designed to enable the person at risk to have a security awareness and understand who they should call as well as what information would be expected of them.

69. **Recommendation 7- The above identified members of staff who may be at risk should be offered a security response plan, existing SRP's should be revisited to ensure that they remain current.**

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

70. Recommendation 1- A full security review of the building at 10 Show place is recommended.
71. Recommendation 2- We recommend a revisit to the existing security review and a gap analysis conducted with a focus on implementing a more active response to security policy including scenario training with key personnel such as security guards and key staff.
72. Recommendation 3- We recommend the presence of enhanced security at the 2015 APM, Thompson & Clark can assist with management of the security at this event.
73. Recommendation 4- We recommend that Southern Response limit its contact with Mr [REDACTED] to written correspondence only.

74. [REDACTED]

75. Recommendation 6-The above identified members of staff who may be at risk should be offered a residential security review.

76. Recommendation 7-The above identified members of staff who may be at risk should be offered a security response plan, existing SRP's should be revisited to ensure that they remain current.

CONCLUSION

77. Linda I trust that this report meets your expectations and that these recommendations enable Southern Response to have a more enhanced security methodology and confidence around its vulnerability to risk. I can provide costing as to our role for each of these recommendations as and when required and look forward to hearing from you.

Yours faithfully

[REDACTED]

Gavin Clark

[REDACTED]

